vollenhoven
newsletter
Editor: Anthony Tol (Free
University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
Editorial Committee:
Kornelis A. Bril, secretary (Free University, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands; retired), John H. Kok (Dordt College, Sioux Center, usa),
Robert S. Sweetman (Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, Canada)
No.1,
July 2003
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1. K.A. Bril –
Publications to appear bearing on the problem-historical method
2. A. Tol – Vollenhoven’s
‘Introduction to Philosophy’
A.Tol – On Translating Vollenhoven’s term ‘consequent
probleemhistorische methode’
Further information
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Dr.
K.A. Bril, secretary, Belle van Zuylenlaan 32, 1183 EJ Amstelveen, The
Netherlands, (e) kabril@planet.nl
The
Vollenhoven Foundation is registered with the Chamber of Commerce of Amsterdam,
registration number: S 41216967. Gifts or donations for the Foundation are tax
deductible. Bank connection of the Foundation: abn amro Bank nv,
The Netherlands; account nr. 48.91.81.694.
Residents of Canada or the United States can
forward gifts, marked "Vollenhoven Foundation", to Dr. John H.
Kok, Dordt College, 498 Fourth Ave. n.e.,
Sioux Center, Iowa 51250, usa.
A.
Tol, editor, c/o Free University, Philosophy Department, De Boelelaan 1105,
1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands, (e) a.tol@ph.vu.nl
Design: De Zaak Haes (www.zaakhaes.nl)
Introduction
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The D.H.Th. Vollenhoven
Foundation is pleased to present this Newsletter. The Foundation hopes that
this Newsletter will promote the exchange of information and ideas related to
the life, work and thought of Vollenhoven.
Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven was the first full-time appointee
in philosophy at the Free University Amsterdam. He held the chair in philosophy
from 1926 till his retirement in 1963. When he died in 1978 the family
deposited his academic papers in the Historical Documentation Centre (hdc) of the Free University. On behalf
of the hdc, dr. Johan
Stellingwerff catalogued the extensive content of Vollenhoven’s archives. This
has opened the archives for academic study.
In 1997, Mr. Herman Nijenhuis, a son-in-law of Vollenhoven and a
retired lawyer, took the initiative in setting up the D.H.Th. Vollenhoven
Foundation. The Foundation’s primary aim is to promote the publication of
Vollenhoven’s work and to encourage the study of Vollenhoven’s thought. Once
the Foundation was legally established, the Vollenhoven family transferred the
legal rights with regard to the Vollenhoven archives to the Foundation.
The Vollenhoven Foundation is governed by a small board. Herman
Nijenhuis was its first chairman. After the Foundation was successfully
established and its first publication venture completed, he withdrew. Sander
Griffioen, professor of social and cultural philosophy at the Free University,
took over the chair. Sander has been a board member from the start. Two other
members complete the board: Kornelis (Kor) Bril, who is its secretary, and
Anthony (Tony) Tol, treasurer.
In 2000 the first publication appeared under the auspices of the
Foundation, D.H.Th. Vollenhoven,
Schematische Kaarten (De Zaak Haes, Amstelveen; isbn 90-805180-2-6), by K.A. Bril and P.J. Boonstra. These
‘schematic charts’ present Vollenhoven’s overview of philosophical conceptions
in the history of philosophy in terms of a grid of systematic types and
historical currents of thought. This work began as a revision of the original
charts Vollenhoven made available in 1962, consisting of 62 folio-sized pages.
On the basis of later publications and manuscripts, these charts are brought up
to date. An introduction and an extensive lexicon were added, resulting in a
volume of 422 pages. To the pleasant surprise of the editors, the book received
the Herman Dooyeweerd Prize given during the International Symposium ‘Culture
and Christianity’ of the Association for Reformational Philosophy in 2001 (see Beweging, March 2002, p.13).
At present various activities are taking place on different
continents involving Vollenhoven’s thought and work, either directly or indirectly.
In order to promote such activities, the board of the Foundation has decided
to sponsor a Newsletter. Its aim is to announce and inform about work in
progress related to Vollenhoven studies and to be a medium for interested
scholars and students to interact with respect to whatever might advance
Vollenhoven studies and their own interest in these studies. The board is very
pleased to have found John Kok and Bob Sweetman willing to be on the editorial
committee, thereby securing its international status.
To give the Newsletter a broader outreach, we have decided to use
English throughout. The editorial committee anticipates at least one, perhaps
two issues per year of modest scope. Material forwarded for inclusion in the
Newsletter will be the primary responsibility of its sender. Electronically
mailed versions of the Newsletter are free of charge.
Kor Bril & Tony Tol
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Report on work in progress
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Publications to appear bearing
on the Problem-Historical Method; An overview of work in progress
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Dr. Kornelis A. Bril.
Four publications are
planned to appear under the auspices of the Vollenhoven Foundation. They are
currently in an advanced state of preparation. Some may hopefully, deo volente, appear this year.
I The first is a volume, in Dutch, which will
contain two previously published articles by Vollenhoven and two items (a
syllabus and lecture notes) not previously published. The working title is: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, De consequent-probleemhistorische methode
en de geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte (approximately 135 pgs.).
I.1 ‘Conservatisme en
progressiviteit in de wijsbegeerte’. Originally published in Conservatisme en Progressiviteit in de Wetenschap
(Kampen: Kok, 1959), pp. 35-48.
I.2 Kort overzicht van de geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte; a syllabus
of Vollenhoven’s last complete overview of the history of philosophy; made
available in mimeograph form by Theja, Amsterdam, 1956, 44 pgs.
I.3 ‘De
consequent probleemhistorische methode’ originally published in Philosophia Reformata 26 (1961), pp.
1-34.
I.4 Referaat
Gnostiek (not previously published lecture on Gnosticism, held in 1965; 12
pgs.)
Each of
these texts will be annotated. The sequence of these items reflects an increase
in specialization. The indicated size of the volume does not include the introduction,
tables, a bibliography and the indexes.
II A translation of I, provisionally entitled:
D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, The Problem Historical
Method and the History of Philosophy, translated by the Rev. John DeKievit
(approximately 135 pgs.)
II.1 Conservatism
and Progressiveness in Philosophy.
II.2 Short
Survey of the History of Philosophy.
II.3 The
Problem-historical Method.
II.4 Gnosticism.
Notes of a lecture
Remarks pertaining to I and II.
1 The Dutch text of Short Survey II.2., i.e. I.2., was initially made available on a
computer diskette by John Kok and his associates of Dordt College, and placed
on the website of the Centre for Reformational Philosophy [Centrum voor Reformatorische
Wijsbegeerte] in Amersfoort. The Dutch text has been edited, and the English translation is completed.
2 While the work was in progress, Stephen Francke
quite unexpectedly made a copy available of an earlier translation of the text
of I.1 Conservatism and Progressiveness
by himself and Bob Sweetman.
3 The text of I.3. was scanned by Pete Boonstra.
His help has been much appreciated.
4 The texts I.1. and I.3 still need to be
annotated. The fact that I.2. (the ‘Short Survey’) is also to appear will
greatly facilitate the required annotation of I.1. and I.3. Many of the notes
can be limited to intertextual references. The annotations will also be translated
and incorporated into the English edition.
5 Vollenhoven revised the text of I.3. in a
‘privatissimum’ session in September 1966. Rev. Dr. Henk van der Laan made
accurate notes of the changes. These will be incorporated into the text.
6 I.4., the lecture on Gnosticism, was edited some time ago. The text was initially based
on notes made by K.J. Popma, who attended the lecture. Dr. Johan Stellingwerff
found Vollenhoven’s own notes of the lecture when setting up the Vollenhoven archives
for the Historical Documentation Centre of the Free University. These notes
were a reliable aid in checking and editing Popma’s notes. The editor has
included a comparison of Vollenhoven’s conclusions with those of recent
research of dr. A.P. Bos and others. This text of 12 pages is now being
translated by the Rev. DeKievit.
7 Suggestions made by the translator have
resulted in the addition of numerous, more expansive annotations for the
English version of the Short Survey of the history of philosophy (I.2. / II.2.)
These have yet to be included in the Dutch edition.
III D.H.Th.
Vollenhoven Wijsgerig Woordenboek
[Philosophical Dictionary] (ca. 350 pgs.)
This volume collects the philosophical articles
that Vollenhoven wrote for the (15 volume)
Oosthoek Encyclopedie. Pete Boonstra scanned most of the articles, only about
a dozen of volume 15 remain to be done. Where necessary for purposes of
clarification, an article has been annotated. Some topics, germane to the
problem-historical method, were not included in separate articles by Vollenhoven.
This lacuna has been filled by the editor, who has composed the articles
himself. For example, he has written the articles on inter alia ‘andrological dualism’, ‘Arabian/Islamic philosophy’,
‘Hippocratizing thought’, ‘cosmogono-cosmological thought’, ‘mythologizing
thought’, ‘semi-mystical thought’. A final check will be made of all the 15 volumes
to ensure that no article, identifiably by Vollenhoven, is overlooked.
The volume
will include a summary overview of all the types and currents that occur in the
method. The volume will probably not require an extensive introduction.
IV K.A. Bril, Vollenhoven’s
Problem-Historical Method; Introduction and Explorations, translated and
augmented by Ralph W. Vunderink (Amstelveen: De Zaak Haes).
This is a
translation of ‘Probleemhistorische verkenningen’, in A. Tol and K.A. Bril, Vollenhoven als Wijsgeer (Amsterdam,
1992), pp. 215-299. The writer and the translator will co-author an introduction
to this volume.
The
translator, Ralph Vunderink (Jenison, usa),
has cited the original English texts of passages that had been translated into
Dutch, or the existing English translations of French passages that had been
translated in the Dutch edition. The translator was able to make use of the
translation of pages 217-222 by Pete and Jean Boonstra. The whole translation
is now being checked and edited.
Dr.
Vunderink was in the Netherlands earlier this year. He visited the author in
Amstelveen for a second time. They were now able to discuss the completion of
the project. The manuscript should be ready in the course of this year. It will
consist of about 120 pages, including a new introduction by Bril en Vunderink,
a bibliography and indexes.
The four projects,
mentioned above, are in an advanced state of preparation. Publishing via the
better known publishing companies will probably result in a prohibitive cost
price. It seems advisable to use the facilities of J.F. Seijlhouwer of ‘De Zaak
Haes’ and Reprohouse. Seijlhouwer’s marketing of Vollenhoven’s Schematische Kaarten, in 2000 (isbn 90-805180-2-6), was very
satisfactory.
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Vollenhoven’s
Introduction to Philosophy
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Anthony
Tol
For more than 20 years
(from 1926 to 1948) Vollenhoven gave an introduction to philosophy course that
was a required course for all first year students of the Free University. He
took the opportunity which this course presented to develop the main contours
of his idea of Christian philosophy. Initially there was no literature
available for the students. Vollenhoven therefore arranged to have his notes
typed up as a syllabus, which he titled ‘Isagoogè Philosophiae’ (the Greek
equivalent of ‘Introduction to Philosophy’). The first complete version of this
syllabus appeared in 1930. Vollenhoven continued to develop his thought, and so
over the years many versions of the ‘Isagoge’ appeared. (According to my
Webster, ‘isagoge’ is an acceptable English rendering of ‘introduction’.) The
last syllabus-version of the Isagoge is from 1943, later (in 1967) retyped,
without alterations, to keep the text in supply. But in his own copy
Vollenhoven made considerable changes until 1945.
This personal copy of the Isagoge is in fact the most definitive
version of the text, and it is now being made available via the Vollenhoven
site of the Centre for Reformational Philosophy. (There are some
technical difficulties caused by the drawings, but they should soon be resolved.)
This version of the Isagoge is also the basis of an English translation by John
Kok, that can hopefully soon be published.
Given the importance of this document for understanding
Vollenhoven’s thought, but also its historical value in terms of the development
of ‘reformational thought’, a critical edition of the text has been completed
in which all the distinct editions (ten in all) prior to 1945 have been
incorporated. This edition will make it possible to (finally) initiate a
thorough study of Vollenhoven’s contribution to reformational thought.
This critical edition, I should add, will be entirely in the Dutch
language. With a definitive Dutch text available, possible translations of
(parts of) Vollenhoven’s older texts can always be entertained. The supporting
material of the editor (myself) is also in Dutch. The last phase, now
underway, is the writing of an extensive introduction in which the main
features of Vollenhoven’s thought and its development, as attested by this
material between 1930 and 1945, are discussed.
Along with this editorial work, the undersigned continues his own
study of Vollenhoven (in English). He hopes to complete several papers on
Vollenhoven now in the making. One is on the development of Vollenhoven’s
thought between 1926 and the beginning of the Isagoge, which essentially
continues where John Kok’s thesis, Vollenhoven,
His Early Development (Sioux Center: Dordt College Press, 1992) left off;
another is on the ontology of the Isagoge; and one on the structure of reality
and religion in Vollenhoven.
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On translating Vollenhovens term:
‘Consequent-probleemhistorische methode’
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Anthony
Tol
With various projects of
translating Vollenhoven’s work currently under way, and perhaps others to be
undertaken, it might be appropriate to discuss what the best translation is of
‘consequent-probleemhistorische methode’. This term is the name that Vollenhoven
gave to his approach to the history of philosophy. Clearly it is a term we
ought to try to get right. In particular, the term ‘consequent’ is
challenging, since, despite the identical spelling, the Dutch and the English
meanings are not precisely identical in use.
The usual rendition in
English of the title in question has been ‘consistent problem-historical
method’. A case in point is H. Dooyeweerd in the volume of Philosophia Reformata (1973), that contains essays dedicated to
Vollenhoven on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. This rendition, however,
is not quite satisfactory. The term ‘consistent’ has a distinctly logical
connotation, as Dooyeweerd did not fail to point out (p.6). One would appear to
be saying that the problem-historical method is basically of a logical nature
or elucidates logical connections. Now Vollenhoven did think that a scientific
discipline applies, as part of its method, logical analysis to the discipline’s
subject matter. Vollenhoven wanted his own historical work to be scientifically
responsible, hence there is definitely a logical interest involved. But the
subject matter here is philosophy in its historical development. Vollenhoven
never agreed with Hegel in taking this historico-philosophical subject matter
to be primarily of a logical nature.
Another objection to choosing ‘consistent’ is the implicit
assumption (or at least possibility) of an inconsistent problem-historical
method. Now there may well be inconsistent methods in practice, but you would
not expect anyone to actually propagate an inconsistent method. In that
light, the qualification ‘consistent’ doesn’t have much point.
Finally one could mention that, if Vollenhoven meant ‘consistent’,
he could have used its Dutch equivalent, also written ‘consistent’. There
really is no significant difference in the English and the Dutch uses here.
It seems we must turn to Vollenhoven’s own work to try to get at his
meaning. However, this takes some effort, for Vollenhoven preferred to
demonstrate the method by its results, not by extensive explanatory exercises.
(The best proof of this is Vollenhoven article ‘De consequent
probleemhistorische methode’ in Philosophia
Reformata 26 (1961), pp.1-34, which is primarily a demonstration in use,
and offers explanations only marginally.)
Though Vollenhoven
published historical results related to what he came to call the ‘consequent
probleem-historische methode’ from 1945 on, the first occurrence of the term
would appear to be in the Preface of his ‘History of Philosophy’, volume I (on
pre-Platonic thought, published in 1950). To date no earlier use has been
found. But this occurrence in the preface (dated 1 January 1950, implying that
this was the last part of the book to be written) appears to have been an
after-thought. I cannot find the term anywhere else in the body of this 600
page book, not even in the Introduction (pp.13-16), where Vollenhoven
specifically discusses the method he uses. It is also not listed in the index.
The after-thought, so it seems, did not ‘take’ immediately. In 1951 he spoke of
‘general [algemeen] problem-historical research’ (Phil. Ref.16 (1951), p.24) and in 1954 he twice used the term
‘universal [universeel] problem-historical method’ (Phil.Ref. 19 (1954), p.165, and Correspondentiebladen
18, July 1954, p. 21). But the Preface of the ‘History’ volume is still the
best text to discern his meaning. So to the Preface we turn.
Let me add that H. Evan Runner did not include the Preface in the
part of the ‘History’ volume he translated. Given his close relation to
Vollenhoven at the time when this volume was written, his translation would
have carried considerable weight. In his dissertation on Aristotle, published
in 1951, he speaks of ‘the new method’ (pp.37, 46), ‘Vollenhoven’s method’
(p.50), and twice ‘problem-historical method’ (p.46, 155). Actually, the full
reference on page 46 is: ‘general ‘problem-historical method’’.
In the Preface of
‘History of Philosophy’, the term in question occurs twice, or almost twice.
The first time Vollenhoven speaks of ‘probleemhistorische methode’ (p.5), and
only the second time is it ‘consequent-probleemhistorische methode’ (p.6). Is
there a difference here?
Vollenhoven uses the term ‘probleemhistorische methode’ here in
reference to the kind of historical research he has been conducting. He
focuses primarily on philosophical conceptions. He speaks of a philosophical
conception (which we may think of as the systematic core of a philosopher’s thought)
as being composed of a multiplicity of themes. These themes first need to be researched
separately, he claims, so as to be in a better position to be able to sketch
how they interweave. Here, already, we can recognize the ‘problem’ part and the
‘historical’ part of the descriptive term ‘probleemhistorisch’, for the
problem-part is linked to ‘theme’, while the historical-part is related to the
‘interweaving’.
A theme is said to consist
of a problem (of philosophy) and its various solutions. For example, we could
take the theme of universal-individual. The problem implicit in this theme is:
What is the relation between the universal (or universality) and the individual
(or individuality/particularity)? Vollenhoven discovers various solutions, ranging
from an extreme universalism (holism) to an extreme individualism (solipsism),
with various mediating solutions in between (‘partial universalism’, ‘macro-
and microcosm’). The themes that Vollenhoven in particular focuses on are those
that highlight the understanding of reality. Besides that of
‘universal-particular’, he also selects: ‘monism (≠holism)-dualism (or
pluralism of being)’, ‘genesis-structure’ and ‘the nature and place of the
law’. In connection with each of these themes, understood as problems, a
variety of solutions has arisen historically. When a philosopher’s conception
(of reality) is said to consist of a number of themes, then it is the
particular solutions of the problems which the themes focus on that delineate
(or constitute) that particular conception.
We note that in Vollenhoven’s listing of themes, he also includes
that of mythologizing and non-mythologizing thought. In use, this merges with
that of genesis and structure, for the two themes together gives rise to three
possibilities: theogono-cosmogonic thought (i.e. primarily genetic),
cosmogono-cosmological thought (i.e. genetic and structural) and purely
cosmological thought (i.e. primarily structural). The first of these is
mythologizing, the other two are non-mythologizing.
The interweaving pertains
to how these themes interrelate. A specific philosophical conception is of
itself already an interweaving (systematic grasp) of chosen solutions of the
problems implicit in themes. Such a conception needs to be actually formulated,
and to that extent it is a historical reality. But Vollenhoven has something
broader in mind. He specifically states in this preface that he is not going to
apply a monographic method, in which only one specific theme (say, like A.O.
Lovejoy’s ‘the great chain of being’), or a specific solution of a problem
implicit in a theme (say, the history of individualism) is highlighted. This
would not yield an adequate representation of the history of philosophy.
Vollenhoven wanted rather ‘to trace the objective order (zakelijke orde’) of
all those themes and problems of philosophy which, in the course of centuries,
had influenced Western European thought’ (p.6). Here the phrase ‘all those
themes and problems’ needs to be read against the background of Vollenhoven’s
thesis that problems in epistemology, anthropology, social philosophy, and the
like, are rooted in themes or problems pertaining to the nature of reality
(ontological and/or cosmological). [Note: The all-inclusive nature of the
method kept words like ‘universeel’ or ‘algemeen’ in the running as an
alternative to ‘consequent’.] Thus, the interweaving of themes that Vollenhoven
wished to trace, comes down to the study of the wayward course of the main
(ontological and cosmological) themes of Western European thought, as
evidenced by the philosophical conceptions of Western thinkers. Essential to
such a study is comparing philosophical conceptions so as to grasp the nature
and the extent of the agreement or difference between the solutions regarding
the determining problems of a conception.
This ‘tracing’ of the ‘objective order’ is marked by a
two-dimensional grid of (time bound and successive) currents and (time resistant
and contemporaneous) types of thought. The theme of ‘the nature and place of
the law’ governs the currents, in the sense that the solutions to the problem
that that theme addresses occur sequentially in the course of the development
of thought. The focus of this theme concerns the source of what is normative,
and the solutions of the problem involved are the ‘normative strategies’ (my
term; TT) defended and abided by at a particular period of time. [We cannot
simply focus on the law, for its essential reality is to impinge. Thus any
consideration of the law involves some measure of response to it, a response
that formulates an ‘ought’, whether as scientific procedure, social norms,
principles of morality and justice, etc., hence my term ‘normative strategy’.
When a response, being human work, doesn’t ‘hold up’, new solutions are
sought.] The remaining themes all concern structural features of a conception.
The alternatives of the solutions of the problems inherent in these themes are
more enduring in the sense that they can recur in later thought and thus form a
type of the conception involved.
In later years, after ‘current’ (1950) had unobtrusively become
‘time (bound) current’ (1956, in the Dutch version of Short Survey, p.40), Vollenhoven tended to look upon the
problem-historical method as addressing ‘two main problems’, namely that of the
law and that of the complex ‘vertical structure of things’. Since the latter
phrase pulls the themes that pertain to a type of conception together, in
speaking of ‘two main problems’ Vollenhoven essentially links the themes as
listed above more explicitly to the two-dimensional grid of currents and
types.
So much for the term
‘probleemhistorisch’. Vollenhoven continues his Preface by reporting what his
experience has been while working with this method. Naturally the conceptions
of the important or influential thinkers have to be given their due. But, Vollenhoven
reports, to his surprise he often found that thinkers, who are merely of secondary
importance, appeared to mediate between the more prominent thinkers. They are
‘the missing links’ (‘de ontbrekende schakels’) between them, and this places
these (prominent) thinkers in a new light. Vollenhoven then states: ‘In this
way, gradually, the historical connections (‘historische verbanden’) were
successively exposed, and this made the ideal attractive of presenting an
orienting lay-out of the whole labyrinth, initially so confusing, of
philosophical conceptions’ (p.6). In speaking of his method in which this is
carried out, Vollenhoven now speaks of ‘deze [this(!)]
consequent-probleemhistorische methode’.
It would be difficult to miss what the added word ‘consequent’ (in
Dutch) is meant to convey here. It relates to the ‘missing links’, and hence to
the possibility of seeing the history of philosophy as being more than merely
dotted by (the few) prominent or original thinkers. It is a history of an
ongoing reflection on problems and their possible solutions, and this history
also involves ‘secondary figures’. Their importance in terms of historical
study lies in their making evident that the philosophical themes, or the
various solutions of problems pertaining to these themes, delineate traditions,
showing that an influence of the past is historically ‘picked up’, transformed,
and, in being represented anew, becomes an inheritance for the future. Hence
the ‘labyrinth of philosophical conceptions’, that Vollenhoven speaks of, becomes
more amenable to an overview by means of an orienting lay-out of traditions in
virtue of the ‘historical’ relevance of the conceptions of secondary figures,
who are noted in terms of both their type(s) of thought and the current(s) of
their time. It is in this way that the ‘problem-historical method’ attempts to
be historically complete with respect to
prior thought that is passed on insofar as this thought pertains to
philosophical conceptions concerning the nature of reality. Thus the Dutch
term ‘consequent’, as used here, has the connotation of being thorough, all inclusive and with a view to
historical consequences. The term ‘consistent’ does not deny any of this,
but it also does not suggest it.
What we see Vollenhoven doing, which is also very evident in the
above mentioned article, ‘De consequent probleemhistorische methode’, is
studying the history of philosophy as philosophy progresses. From the time
that philosophical thought is first recognizable (for Vollenhoven this is in
Musaeus and Hesiod), there has been an internal influence of its further
progress. Each phase of philosophy’s existence formulates conceptual
possibilities which, in part at least, reflect the inheritance of the past, but
which in turn may be of influence for the future. Vollenhoven’s ‘time currents’
specify the phases through which philosophy historically passes, while the ‘types’
indicate those solutions to problems that (more or less) persist, despite
changes in phases. Nothing here is rigid or predetermined. The phases in which
thought is renewed reflect the changes that occur in the cultural-historical
bedding of philosophy, requiring an adaptation of its normative assumptions,
while the type of thought seized from the past may be varied or even rejected
in favour of a new type. Vollenhoven’s method invites and allows the historian
of philosophy to be historically consequential
in tracing the genealogy of thought in its renewal, its variations and its
repetition.
We note in passing that tracing the historically consequential
genealogy of conceptions is not the same thing as tracing the historical
influence of one thinker upon other thinkers. However Vollenhoven does give the
impression of attributing the consequential genealogy of conceptions, at
least in part, to a presumed actual personal influence of the thinkers
involved. But personal influences are often very difficult to trace, short of
explicit autobiographical information. Hobbes formulated a (more or less)
materialist conception of thought. Was he influenced by his reading of prior
materialists, or does it derive from his critique of, and reaction to, Descartes’
‘res cogitans’? One may well formulate ‘novel solutions’ to problems without
being aware of historical precedents. I think we can maintain that, while a
consequential genealogy may indeed involve personal influences, it need not
necessarily do so. Also we may not be able to determine what the actual lines
of influence were. We learn much philosophy from reading the classical texts of
the primary figures without always being aware of the ‘secondary figures’
between us and the primary figures. Perhaps Vollenhoven exaggerated the
presumed relevance of secondary or mediating figures. But he is certainly right
in insisting that a systematic study of
the history of philosophy needs to mention and elucidate the roles of these
secondary figures. Surely no one can be satisfied historically with, say, a
view of philosophy in the Middle Ages as (if I may simplify) consisting
primarily of Platonic, Aristotelian and Augustinian influences. A lot of
absorption and transformation of thought was going on in the Middle Ages,
which in turn made philosophical thought during the Renaissance such a complex
historical phenomenon. And without the many ‘secondary Renaissance thinkers’
the rise of Modern philosophy is quite unintelligible. Agreement and
differences between conceptions of thought can be ascertained without knowing
who was read approvingly by whom, and still be looked upon as historically relevant.
So my considered suggestion is to translate
‘consequent-probleemhistorische methode’ as ‘consequential problem-historical
method’. Admittedly, this sounds cumbersome in English. Vollenhoven’s own
alternatives, such as ‘general’ or ‘universal’, at least sound better. (Kor Bril has suggested ‘integral’.) But Vollenhoven
was a stickler for precision. Once we grasp what he means to say, the word
‘consequential’ seems the adequate conceptual choice. Many of the terms he
minted do not roll easily from the tongue, so in that respect this suggestion
follows suit. To counterbalance this handicap, we could, also in this respect,
conform to Vollenhoven’s practice of using the full title selectively and sparingly,
and limiting most occurrences to simply ‘problem-historical method’.
The (Dutch) terms
‘consequent’ and ‘inconsequent’ also occur within the typology of the method,
namely in the characterization of the two (main) types of empiricism. Here a
logical element is more directly involved in the use of these terms than in
the import of the method’s name. Thus one could translate: ‘consistent
empiricism’ and ‘inconsistent empiricism’. In fact, that would be the preferred
translation here. ‘Empiricism’, as here used ontologically by Vollenhoven,
denotes a dualistic conception involving a higher principle, that is
individual, and a lower principle, that is universal (general). The lower
principle is somatic, and this is taken to have only general characteristics.
The higher principle is mental and specific. In the conception called
‘consistent (‘consequent’) empiricism’ the higher principle is psychical; via the
bodily organs it registers sense-data as immediate knowledge. In ‘inconsistent
(‘inconsequent’) empiricism’, the lower principle has its own psychical form as
is fitting for a (general) animal body. Here impressions are first reflected
before becoming ideas. The ideas are
entertained by the higher
principle of personality, being an entity in its own right, with its own
intuition, and serving as principle of individuation of mental functions. The assumption
here of a substantial personality is deemed by Vollenhoven to be inconsistent
with the empiricism of a ‘common sense’ that is defended here.
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